The Right to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action: Nebraska\u27s  Clearly Statutory  Rule: \u3ci\u3eGretna Public School District No. 37 v. State Board of Education\u3c/i\u3e, 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978) by Wefso, James R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 4 Article 7
1979
The Right to Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action: Nebraska's "Clearly Statutory"
Rule: Gretna Public School District No. 37 v. State
Board of Education, 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268
(1978)
James R. Wefso
University of Nebraska College of Law, jwefso@security1stbank.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
James R. Wefso, The Right to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action: Nebraska's "Clearly Statutory" Rule: Gretna Public School
District No. 37 v. State Board of Education, 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978), 58 Neb. L. Rev. 1139 (1979)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol58/iss4/7
Note
The Right to Judicial Review of
Administrative Agency Action:
Nebraska's "Clearly Statutory"
Rule
Gretna Public School District No. 37 v. State Board of
Education, 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
[I]n our system of remedies, an individual whose interest is acutely
and immediately affected by an administrative action presumptively has a
right to secure at some point a judicial determination of its validity.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The decisions of administrative agencies may have serious con-
sequences for persons and institutions who must comply with
agency rules and regulations. Legislative bodies have recognized
this fact, and have provided for judicial review of certain agency
actions.2 Such legislation often results in laws which provide for
judicial review of "final agency action," "contested cases" or simi-
lar terms used to encompass those agency actions which legisla-
tors feel should be subject to review.3 In addition, statutes which
authorize actions of specific agencies often specifically grant or
deny the right of appeal from such actions.
Courts and commentators have long debated the proper treat-
ment of statutes which grant agencies the authority to make cer-
tain determinations, where such statutes fail to either grant or
deny the right of judicial review of those determinations. 4 The re-
actions of courts to this issue have ranged from statements that
there is a presumption of a right to judicial review in the absence
of statutory language to the contrary,5 to statements that the right
1. L. JAFFE, JuDICmL CONTROL OF ADMn'sTRATvE ACTION 336 (1965).
2. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-910 to - 919 (Reissue 1976).
3. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-910 to -919 (Reissue 1976).
4. See F. COOPER, STATE ADmNmSTRATIVE LAW 672-79 (1965); K. DAvis, ADmNs-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE 941-95 (Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 336-59;
B. SCHWARTZ, ADnmrmSTRATIVE LAw 435-37 (1976).
5. See notes 48-62 & accompanying text infra.
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to judicial review is statutory, and will be denied absent language
granting such review.6
In Gretna Public School District No. 37 v. State Board of Educa-
tion,7 the Nebraska Supreme Court stated its view regarding the
treatment of administrative agency statutes which do not clearly
provide for a right of judicial review: "The right of appeal in this
state is clearly statutory and unless the statute provides for an ap-
peal from the decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does
not exist.' 8
This note will examine the development and significance of the
Nebraska "clearly statutory" rule. In addition, it will consider the
views of other courts on this issue, and the wisdom of adopting a
restrictive viewpoint regarding citizens' rights to challenge the ac-
tions of government agencies.
II. THE DECISION
A. Facts
In January, 1975, the Nebraska Commissioner of Education no-
tified the Gretna Public School District No. 37, that its share of
state school funds would be reduced because it had employed a
teacher who did not possess a valid teaching certificate. 9 In May,
1976, the school district filed a petition before the State Board of
Education for a declaratory ruling.10 The State Board ruled that
6. See notes 78-90 & accompanying text infra
7. 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
8. Id. at 772, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
9. Id. at 770, 272 N.W.2d at 268. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1301 to - 1308.01 (Reissue
1976) govern the procedures for collection and disbursement of certain levies
which are designated for school purposes. Section 79-1304(4) provides for a
reduction of funds if a school employs a legally unqualified teacher.
10. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-912 (Reissue 1976) provides that, upon petition by inter-
ested persons, state administrative agencies may issue declaratory rulings
regarding the applicability of the rules or statutes enforceable by the agency.
In light of the outcome of this case, a question arises as to whether the school
district took the appropriate action at this stage. An examination of both the
statutes regarding distribution of school funds and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act indicate that the school's request for a declaratory ruling was in-
deed the action called for by the statute. The statutes regarding distribution
of school funds contain no provisions for contesting actions of the Commis-
sioner of Education regarding distribution of such funds, other than allowing
school districts to seek a reappraisal of the school lands. See generally NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 79-1031 to -1307.01 (Reissue 1976). Presumably, one must then
rely on the Administrative Procedure Act which prescribes methods for con-
testing action of Nebraska state agencies. When an agency applies a rule, one
available action is to challenge the validity of the rule. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
911 (Reissue 1976) provides that a person may challenge the validity of a rule
by a petition for a declaratory judgment addressed to the district court of
Lancaster County. The obvious alternative to challenging the validity of a
[Vol. 58:1139
1979] JUDICIAL REVIEW 1141
the action of the Commissioner was proper."
The school district then filed a petition for appeal in Lancaster
County District Court.12 The petition was fied pursuant to a provi-
sion of the Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act, which grants
an appeal to "any person aggrieved by a final decision in a con-
tested case."'13 The district court determined that the penalty had
been properly imposed but improperly computed, and the court re-
versed and remanded the order of the State Board.14 The State
Board then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court and the
school district cross-appealed.' 5
B. Holding
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision did not consider any of
the substantive assignments of error regarding the action of the
Commissioner. Instead, the court dismissed the case on the
ground that there was no right of appeal from a declaratory ruling
of an administrative agency.' 6 In reaching that conclusion, the
court first examined the declaratory ruling statute to determine
whether appeals were provided from declaratory rulings. 7 The
rule, is to challenge the applicability of the rule. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912
(Reissue 1976) provides that a person may challenge the applicability of a
rule by a petition for a declaratory ruling, addressed to the agency. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 84-913 (Reissue 1976) provides for notice and procedures for hearings
by agencies in contested cases. In NEB. REV. STAT. 74-901(3) (Reissue 1976),
"contested case" is defined as a proceeding where the parties' rights are re-
quired to be determined by a hearing. The statutes governing the distribu-
tion of school funds do not provide for a hearing on the question of the proper
allocation of school funds, so an agency hearing as a "contested case" would
not have been an available option for the school district.
Finally, the school district could have sought either an injunction under
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1063 (Reissue 1975) to prevent the enforcement of the
order, or a temporary restraining order under NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1064(2)
1065 (Reissue 1975).
At this early stage in the matter, it seems the school district's decision to
seek a declaratory ruling on the applicability of the rule was the action called
for by statute, assuming that there was little question as to validity of the
rule. The injunction method would have necessitated a hearing, the time and
expense of which was probably not required in seeking a declaratory ruling,
and a favorable declaratory ruling would have avoided the need to go through
a district court proceeding.
11. 201 Neb. at 770, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
12. Id. at 771, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976).
14. 201 Neb. at 771, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912 (Reissue 1976) states in pertinent part: "A declara-
tory ruling, if issued after argument and stated to be binding, is binding be-
tween the agency and the petitioner on the state of facts alleged unless it is
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court determined that the legislature did not intend to provide for
such appeals. 18 The court relied on the fact that the legislature
had changed the wording of the Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which served as a pattern for the Nebraska Act.19 In-
stead of providing that declaratory rulings would be subject to
review in the manner provided for the review of contested cases, 20
the legislature determined that such rulings would be subject to
review "in the manner provided in the code of civil procedure."'21
This factor, more than any other, is the technical basis for the deci-
sion, i.e., that the school district had appealed the declaratory rul-
ing in the manner provided for the appeal of contested cases, 22
rather than in the manner provided in the code of civil procedure. 23
The court then examined the statute which provides for appeals
of contested cases24 to determine whether appeals from declara-
tory rulings were within the scope of that statute. In determining
whether a declaratory ruling was a "contested case," the court re-
cited the statutory definition of the term as a '"proceeding before
an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined
after an agency hearing."25 The court held that a declaratory rul-
ing was not a contested case as that term was used in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.26
altered or set aside by a court. Such a ruling is subject to review in the man-
ner provided in the code of civil procedure."
18. 201 Neb. at 772, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
19. Id. at 771-772, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
20. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 7 (1946 version).
21. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976).
22. Id.
23. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912 (Reissue 1976). Brief for Appellant asserted that
to appeal a declaratory ruling "in the manner provided in the code of civil
procedure", the appeal must be a petition in error pursuant to NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1975). Brief for Appellant at 10-12, Gretna Pub.
School Dist. No. 37 v. State Bd. of Educ., 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
Brief for Appellee asserted that appeal by petition in error was not appropri-
ate because the action of the Commissioner of Education was not the exer-
cise of "judicial function", as required by NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1901 (Reissue
1975). Brief for Appellee at 17, 18, Gretna Pub. School Dist. No. 37 v. State Bd.
of Educ., 201 Neb. 769, 272 N.W.2d 268 (1978).
24. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Reissue 1976).
26. 201 Neb. at 772, 272 N.W.2d at 269. See notes 29-30 & accompanying text infra.
In addition to the fact that the declaratory ruling did not fit squarely into the
terms of the statute defining "contested case", the concept of declaratory rul-
ings in general does not imply an adversary situation. Rather, declaratory
rulings are usually intended as a means by which one can obtain an opinion
from an agency regarding the application of a given statute, rule or regula-
tion. In Gretna, the school district sought the declaratory ruling in reaction
to a decision by the agency. Further, since the statute which authorizes de-
[Vol. 58:1139
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After concluding that neither the declaratory ruling statute nor
the appeal statute clearly provided for appeal of declaratory rul-
ings, the court stated its rule of law regarding the right of appeal in
Nebraska: "The right of appeal in this state is clearly statutory and
unless the statute provides for an appeal from the decision of a
quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does not exist."2 7 A strict appli-
cation of the "clearly statutory" rule led the court to decide that
there was no right of appeal from a declaratory ruling of an admin-
istrative agency under the method of appeals of contested cases. 28
m. ANALYSIS
A. Definition of "Contested Case" and the Effect of L.B. 137
In Gretna, the court gave no justification for holding that a de-
claratory ruling of an administrative agency was not a "contested
case" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.
However, since the term is defined as "a proceeding before an
agency",29 it seems apparent that the court was not willing to clas-
sify a declaratory ruling as a '"proceeding." In addition, declara-
tory rulings probably would not meet the statutory "contested
case" requirement that the proceeding be one in which the legal
rights, duties, and privileges are required by law to be determined
at an agency hearing.30
As a result of Gretna, the state school funds involved there
were considered privileges within the meaning of the statute, and
the outcome of the case was particularly anomalous in light of this
fact. Furthermore, whether or not required by law, there was a
hearing by the Board of Education to determine the rights of the
school district in the matter. Thus, although the facts of the declar-
atory ruling in this case do not fit squarely into the statutory re-
quirements for a "contested case," an argument can be made that
the situation in which the school district found itself was the type
of situation intended by the legislature to be deserving of judicial
review. The question of whether a declaratory ruling is a "con-
tested case" will no longer be a matter of discretion for the Ne-
braska courts, however, in light of the adoption of L.B. 13731 by the
claratory rulings provides for judicial review in a different manner than that
provided for judicial review of contested cases, it is likely that the court rec-
ognized an intent by the Legislature to distinguish declaratory rulings from
contested cases. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-912, -917. See also note 23 & ac-
companying text supra.
27. 201 Neb. at 772, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
28. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976).
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Reissue 1976).
30. Id.
31. L.B. 137, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill was introduced by Senator Her-
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Nebraska Legislature.3 2
As a result of the passage of L.B. 137, the declaratory ruling stat-
ute currently provides that such rulings are subject to review "in
the manner provided in sections 84-917 to 84-919, Reissue Revised
Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, for the review of decisions in contested
cases."33 Consequently, declaratory rulings of Nebraska adminis-
trative agencies may now be appealed to the district courts, with-
out having to meet "contested case" criteria, or the criteria for a
petition in error.34
B. Evolution of Nebraska's "Clearly Statutory" Rule
The adoption of L.B. 137 has apparently settled the appealabil-
ity of declaratory rulings in Nebraska. However, L.B. 137 does not
address the broader rule enunciated by the court in Gretna.35 As a
result, to gain an understanding of the scope and potential mean-
ing of this "clearly statutory" rule, it is necessary to examine the
development of the rule in Nebraska.
The court in Gretna cites Lydick v. Johns,3 6 a case in which an
individual appealed a revocation of his driver's license by the Ne-
braska Director of Motor Vehicles. 37 Appellant's appeal bond was
not approved by the State Auditor, as required by the statute,38
and the resultant issue was whether this fact destroyed the appeal.
The court ruled that the appeal was invalid because it failed to
comply with the statute authorizing such appeals. 39 The court re-
lied on the "clearly statutory" rule for its decision, but the rule was
applied in a distinctly different situation than that involved in
Gretna. It is clear that the rule as applied in Lydick was meant to
apply to situations where the appeal is clearly provided for in the
statute, but the appellant fails to comply with the statute's proce-
dural requirements. 40 In other cases where the court has relied on
bert Duis, 39th legislative district and was referred to the Committee on Gov-
ernment and Military Affairs before approval by the full legislature.
Worksheet, April 2, 1979, 85th Leg., 1st Sess.
32. Worksheet, April 2, 1979, 85th Leg., 1st Sess.
33. L.B. 137, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (1979). This language replaces the language in
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912 (Reissue 1976) requiring appeals to be "in the man-
ner provided in the code of civil procedure."
34. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1975).
35. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
36. 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970).
37. Id. at 718, 178 N.W.2d at 582.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 721, 178 N.W.2d at 583.
40. Indeed, the court in Gretna omitted the portion of the Lydick rule which puts
the formula in context: 'The right of appeal in this state is clearly statutory
and, unless the statute provides for an appeal from the decision of a quasi-
judicial tribunal, such right does not exist. And if these statutes create such a
right the mode and manner of appeal is statutory and such jurisdiction can
1144 [Vol. 58:1139
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the "clearly statutory" rule, the rule has been used as a basis to
reject an appeal which was not made in the correct manner,4 1
rather than, as in Gretna, to deny the right of appeal altogether.
The application of the "clearly statutory" rule in Gretna could
be read as merely consistent with its application in the previous
Nebraska cases, i.e., that the court in Gretna denied the appeal of
the declaratory ruling merely because the appeal was not brought
in the correct manner.42 However, the language of the court is to
the contrary. The "clearly statutory" rule is not applied to deny
the appeal because of lack of compliance with the declaratory rul-
ing statute.4 3 Rather, the rule is applied to deny the appeal be-
cause the statute providing for appeals of contested cases before
administrative agencies did not provide for an appeal of a declara-
only be conferred in the manner provided by statute." 185 Neb. at 185, 178
N.W. at 582-83 (emphasis added).
41. Peck v. Donlevey, 185 Neb. 812, 172 N.W.2d 613 (1969) (appeal not permitted
due to failure to file in correct court); Radii v. State, 182 Neb. 291, 154 N.W.2d
466 (1967) (appeal not permitted due to failure to serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on defendant); Reiber v. Harris, 179 Neb. 582, 139 N.W.2d 353 (1966)
(appeal not permitted due to failure to obtain approval of the county clerk).
Accord, Brown v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 224, 137 N.W.2d 814 (1965); Drier v.
Knowles Vans, Inc., 144 Neb. 619,14 N.W.2d 222 (1944); Barney v. Platte Valley
Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 230, 13 N.W.2d 120 (1944); Sommerville v.
Board of Comm'rs, 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815 (1927), aFd, 117 Neb. 507, 221
N.W. 433 (1928); County of Cedar v. McKinney Loan & Inv. Co., 1 Neb. (Unoffi)
411, 95 N.W. 605 (1901).
42. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912 (Reissue 1976) and Brief for Appellant, supra
note 23, at 10-12. Appellant argued that the declaratory ruling should have
been appealed by a petition in error under NEB. REV. STAT. 25-1901 (Reissue
1976). The school district contended that a petition in error was only avail-
able if the agency's act was judicial in nature, and since the act of reducing
the school funds was ministerial, and not judicial, a petition was not called
for. This contention of the school district, however, was incorrect because the
school district was not appealing the reduction in funds; it was appealing the
declaratory ruling of the State Board of Education on a set of facts. Such a
ruling would appear to be judicial in nature.
Under NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1903 (Reissue 1975), in order to seek a reversal,
vacation or modification of an order of a "tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions," one must file a petition in error with a district court, set-
ting forth the errors complained of. The statute also provides for procedures
of summons upon opposing parties, and sets time limits for return of sum-
mons.
If the appeal of the declaratory ruling was brought under the wrong stat-
ute and the case could have been decided on that basis, then technically
there is no need for L.B. 137, which provides that declaratory rulings may now
be appealed under the statue governing appeals in contested cases. It ap-
pears, however, that the court based its decision on a broader ground. See
note 44 & accompanying text infra. If the court had decided the case on the
narrow procedural ground and avoided reliance on the "clearly statutory"
rule, there would have been less need for L.B. 137.
43. 201 Neb. at 172, 272 N.W.2d at 269.
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tory ruling.44 Since it appears possible that the court used the lat-
ter reason for its holding, rather than relying on the narrow
procedural ground, a conclusion that the court intended to estab-
lish a broader rule of statutory interpretation gains validity. Thus,
it is unfortunate that the court did not explain more fully its rea-
sons for adopting the "clearly statutory" approach under these cir-
cumstances.
The broader interpretation of the "clearly statutory" rule, as
suggested above, indicates that the Nebraska court has not merely
applied a well-recognized precedent,45 but has placed that prece-
dent in an entirely different context in order to establish a new
rule of Nebraska administrative law. Namely, that unless a statute
expressly provides for a right of appeal of agency actions and
therein names all possible denotations of such actions, then an ad-
ministrative agency need not fear review of a specifically denoted
action, as no right shall be recognized in the interpretation of gen-
eral statutory language or law.
An alternative approach to the issue of whether a statute pro-
vides for judicial review of agency action would presume that all
statutorily created agency actions were subject to judicial review,
unless clearly denied by statute. Decisions have generally cen-
tered on the differing views on the wisdom of presuming that ad-
ministrative action is reviewable. 46 The following discussion
analyzes the view of the United States Supreme Court and other
state courts on this issue.
C. The Presumption of a Right to Judicial Review
As stated above, the "clearly statutory" rule announced by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Gretna appears to be a subtle state-
ment that judicial review of administrative agency actions will not
be available absent a clear legislative statement providing for judi-
cial review. In other words, a presumption seems to have been es-
tablished against judicial review of agency decisions. This notion,
however, is in direct conflict with the view of the United States
Supreme Court and other federal courts.47
Stark v. Wickard8 is a leading case on the effect of legislative
silence on review. In this case, the relevant statute authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture to fix milk prices.49 A group of milk pro-
ducers brought suit to enjoin the implementation of the Secre-
44. Id.
45. See note 40 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 47-88 infra.
47. See notes 48-62 & accompanying text infra.
48. 321 U.S. 288 (1944).
49. Id. at 290-91.
1146 [Vol. 58:1139
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tary's rules, and the government claimed that review was not
provided for in the statute.5 0 The statute in question was silent
with regard to judicial review. The Court held that congressional
silence did not indicate any legislative intent to preclude view.
The Court stated: "[T] he silence of Congress as to judicial review
is... not to be construed as a denial of authority to the aggrieved
person to seek appropriate relief in the federal courts in the exer-
cise of their general jurisdiction."5' 1 Stark v. Wickard, is probably
the clearest explanation by the Supreme Court of the basic rea-
sons underlying the presumption of review ability.5 2 The opinion
has prompted Professor Jaffe to conclude: "Congress, barring con-
stitutional impediments, may indeed exclude judicial review. But
judicial review is the rule. It rests on the Congressional grant of
general jurisdiction to the Article I courts. '53 The basis of this
presumption, according to the Court, was that Congress had en-
trusted to the courts the responsibility of determining the limits of
statutory grants of authority.54 The Court stated that "under Arti-
cle III, Congress established courts to adjudicate cases and contro-
versies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by
unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unautho-
rized administrative power."55
Accordingly, it appears the view of the Supreme Court is that
the federal courts have been granted general jurisdiction to decide
cases or controversies, and that if Congress wants to insulate cer-
tain agency actions from judicial review, it must clearly state that
intention. Therefore, when the Court is faced with a statute which
is vague or silent on the question of judicial review, the presump-
tion of reviewability will be applied and the Court will rely on a
general statutory grant of authority to support a policy of statutory
construction.
The presumption of a right to judicial review of administrative
action announced in Stark v. Wickard was recognized by Con-
gress when it adopted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).56
This act provides for a broad right of judicial review of agency ac-
tion,5 7 except to the extent the statutes preclude judicial review of
an agency's action or that final authority over certain actions is
50. Id.
51. Id. at 309.
52. See L. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 339-53, wherein Professor Jaffe provides a thor-
ough historical analysis of the development, and reasons for, the presump-
tion.
53. Id. at 346.
54. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).
55. Id.
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
57. Id. § 702.
1979] 1147
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committed to agency discretion.58 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the APA as reinforcing earlier case law supporting the basic
presumption of judicial review.59 In the oft-cited case of Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner,6 0 the Court clearly expressed its support
for the presumption of a right to judicial review when it stated that
"judicial review of a final agency action will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress."'6 1 Cases following Abbott have included clear state-
ments that judicial review of administrative action is the rule. 62
The Nebraska court's "clearly statutory" rule of Gretna, there-
fore, seems to be at odds with the Supreme Court, regarding the
presumption of judicial review. However a limiting factor on this
presumption is the fact that it may be rebutted by a showing of
legislative intent to deny judicial review. 63 Before the Court will
restrict access to judicial review, there must be a showing of "clear
and convincing evidence" of a legislative intent to deny such ac-
cess. 64 In applying this presumption of review, many courts have
interpreted statutes narrowly, only to find that they do not pre-
58. Id. § 701.
59. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
60. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
61. Id. at 140. To support this proposition the Court cited Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S.
367 (1962); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S.
579 (1958); Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
62. In Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1966), the Court stated: "[J]udicial review
of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception
which must be demonstrated." Id. at 166. See National Automatic Laundry &
Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 694-95 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57
(1970). Cf. K. DAVIs, supra note 4, § 28.08 at 946-47 (Supp. 1970), where Pro-
fessor Davis warns that the strong presumption of reviewability in the lan-
guage of Abbott Laboratories should not be read literally and that some
lower courts have not done so.
63. The Veterans Administration is an example of a federal administrative
agency whose major functions are explicitly insulated from judicial review.
See 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1970). Although commentators have criticized this
portion of the legislation, it is clear that Congress explicitly exempted certain
discretionary functions of the V.A. from judicial review. See, e.g., Rabin, Pre-
clusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits:
A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1975). The constitutionality of
the statute barring review of VA. decisions regarding pension benefits was
upheld in Holley v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Ohio 1972), afd
mem., 477 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp.
464 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (statute denying judicial review of certain procedures of
the Department of Transportation upheld.)
64. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. at 379-80 (1962). See generally JAFFE, supra note 1, at
336-59. The Court has not ruled on whether there should be a constitutional
right to judicial review of administrative actions. See notes 67-68 infra.
1148 [Vol. 58:1139
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clude judicial review,65 or have allowed review in the face of statu-
tory language apparently precluding review. 66
Legislatures may allow judicial review of agency actions, but
with certain restrictions. In Ortwein v. Schwab,67 the Court af-
firmed an Oregon decision holding that an appellate court filing fee
of twenty-five dollars did not deny due process or equal protection
as applied to indigents seeking judicial review of agency decisions
reducing their welfare payments. 68
Finally, it is generally recognized that even though judicial re-
view is provided for in some acts and not in others, the presump-
tion of review will still operate to allow review in those statutes
which are silent on the issue.69
In determining whether there should be a presumption of a
right to judicial review of administrative action, the state courts
have used various methods of analysis.7 0 State courts utilized
these varying methods much more frequently before the Abbott
Laboratories7 ' decision. In these cases the issue of when review
65. See, e.g., Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 666-
68 (2d Cir. 1973); Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1973); Berends v.
Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143, 150-51 (D. Minn. 1973).
66. See, e.g., Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953) (statutory clause that
draft board decisions are "final" held to not bar judicial review where the
board acts without evidence to support its finding); Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953) (the finality clause in deportation statutes does not bar review
of fair procedure and sufficiency evidence); Estep v. United States, 327 US.
114 (1945); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
67. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
68. Three Justices (Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall) strongly dissented
in Ortwein, on both due process and equal protection grounds, asserting that
the majority had answered the much-debated question of whether due proc-
ess does require some judicial review. 410 U.S. 656, 662 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). See also Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L REV. 1362 (1953). In
discussing this issue which the Court "studiously has avoided," Justice Doug-
las stated: "Access to the courts before a person is deprived of valuable inter-
ests, at least with respect to questions of law, seems to me to be the essence
of due process." Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 662 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
69. See Comment, Reviewability of Administrative Actiorn The Elusive Search
for a Pragmatic Standard, 1974 DuKE L.J. 382, 384- "It seems reasonable to
conclude, however, that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of
legislative intent to preclude judicial review, the modern day presumption of
review has made the above reasoning [that legislative silence regarding judi-
.cial review barred review where other statutes conferred that right] obso-
lete."
70. See notes 72-74 & accompanying text infra.
71. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See notes 59-61 & accom-
panying text supra. The Abbott Laboratories decision allowed judicial re-
view of actions of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs; it provides one of the
most clear explanations of the Court's viewpoint on the presumption of a
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should be afforded often depended upon the character of the ad-
ministrative action. If the action taken was primarily judicial in
nature, then a presumption of the right to review arose.72
Other state courts, when faced with a statute that was silent on
the question of judicial review, based their decisions on whether
the agency action substantially affected property rights. If so,
those courts were willing to grant review of the action involved.7 3
Another view held that a basic right to review existed where the
issue involved correction of arbitrary agency action, even where
the statute did not expressly provide for judicial review.74
An analysis of numerous, more recent state court decisions on
the issue of presumption of judicial review, reveals that the Ne-
braska "clearly statutory" rule not only conflicts with the view-
point of the United States Supreme Court, but also with the views
of many other state courts as well.75 Minnesota Public Interest Re-
search Group v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council7 6 pro-
right to judicial review. 387 U.S. 136, 139-41. The decision also provided gui-
dance to lower courts regarding the issue of when agency action is "ripe" for
judicial resolution. 387 U.S. 136, 148-153.
72. See, e.g., Beckanstin v. Dougherty County Council of Architects, 215 Ga. 543,
111 S.E.2d 361 (1959); State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev.
144,261 P.2d 515 (1953); Gray v. Board of County Comm'rs, 312 P.2d 959 (Okla.
1957). Many courts, complying with their own common law requirements or
with statutes have had to decide whether an action is "judicial in nature" or
"quasi-judicial." The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that an act is not
judicial in nature if the agency (in this case the decision in question was
made by county commissioners) has no discretion or judgment to exercise in
the matter. Kemerer v. State, 7 Neb. 130 (1878). In Mitchell v. Clay County,
69 Neb. 779, 96 N.W. 673 (1903), the Nebraska court stated: "[C]ounty com-
missioners act quasi judicially in passing upon claims ... whenever such
action involves the determination of questions of fact upon evidence or the
exercise of discretion..... But whenever the course to be pursued ... is
fixed by law, they have no discretion and must follow the law, and their acts
in so doing or endeavoring so to do are ministerial only." Id. at 783-84, 96
N.W.2d at 678 (emphasis in original). See also Snygg v. City of Scottsbluff
Police Dept., 201 Neb. 16, 266 N.W.2d 76 (1978) (actions of the Equal Opportu-
nity Commission in determining the rights of parties under the Fair Employ-
ment Act held to be quasi-judicial in nature); Scott v. State ex. rel Board of
Nursing, 196 Neb. 681, 244 N.W.2d 683 (1976) (actions of the Board of Nursing
in licensing nurses is legislative in nature).
73. See, e.g., In re St. Joseph Lead Co., 352 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1961); Brazosport Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W.2d 747
(1961); Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Title Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 574, 272 S.W.2d 95
(1954).
74. See, e.g., Morris v. Board of County Comm'rs, 150 Colo. 33, 370 P.2d 438 (1962).
75. See, e.g., Klein v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 31 Ill. App. 3d 473, 334
N.E.2d 370 (1975); Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971); Minne-
sota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Environmental Quality
Council, 306 Minn. 370, 237 N.W.2d 375 (1975); In re Senior Appeals Examin-
ers, 60 N.J. 356, 290 A.2d 129 (1972).
76. 306 Minn. 370, 237 N.W.2d 375 (1975).
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vides a clear example of a state court relying on Abbott
Laboratories to support a presumption of judicial review of agency
action. Faced with a statute which was silent on the question of
required hearings or the appealability of certain decisions of the
Environmental Quality Council the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded: "There is a presumption in favor of judicial review of
agency decisions in the absence of statutory decisions to the con-
trary.37 7
In another recent case, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted a
viewpoint which could be classified as a "hybrid" of the presump-
tion of review approach adopted by the Minnesota court, and the
non-presumption approach of the Nebraska court. In U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Wyoming Environment Quality Counci7 8 the court had to
determine whether judicial review was available regarding agency
action on a petition to promulgate a rule.7 9 In announcing the rule
which guided its analysis of the statute, the Wyoming court began
its opinion with a precise statement of a rule identical in scope to
the Nebraska "clearly statutory" rule. The court stated that "the
right of judicial review of administrative decisions is entirely statu-
tory, and... orders of an administrative agency are not review-
able unless made so by statute."8 0 The court followed, however,
with a series of citations to United States Supreme Court decisions
which recognize a presumption of a right to judicial review.81 In
quoting the Court's language on this issue, the Wyoming court in-
dicated that it would require specific statutory language preclud-
ing judicial review before such review would be denied. The court
then examined the statute and concluded that the language pre-
cluded review. 82 However it is unclear from the opinion what ap-
proach the Wyoming court would pursue if a statute was silent on
the question of judicial review of agency action, since the court's
statement that the right of review is "entirely statutory" appears to
conflict with its seeming adoption of the Supreme Court's pre-
77. Id. at 376, 237 N.W.2d at 379.
78. 575 P.2d 749 (Wyo. 1978).
79. Id. at 750-51. Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.24 (1975 Cum. Supp.) provided that persons
could petition agencies requesting the promulgation of a rule. The statute
declared that agency action regarding such petitions "shall be final and not
subject to review."
80. Id. at 750.
81. Id. The court cites from Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967),
to the effect that legislative intent to preclude judicial review must be made
specifically manifest before judicial review will be denied. The court also
cites Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) for authority in stating: "Only upon a
showing of clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent should
the courts restrict access to judicial review." 575 P.2d at 750.
82. See Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.24 (1975 Cum. Supp.).
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sumption of review. 83
Although it is uncertain which approach the Wyoming court
may follow, other states adhere to rules similar to the "clearly stat-
utory" approach of the Nebraska court.84 In Pasch v. Wisconsin De-
partment of Revenue,85 the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed
the case in much the same manner as the Nebraska court in
Gretna. The issue before the Wisconsin court in Pasch was
whether there was a right to judicial review from an order of the
state Tax Appeals Commission refusing to quash a tax assess-
ment.86 The court stated: "The right to appeal from an administra-
tive agency's determination is statutory and does not exist except
where expressly given and cannot be extended to cases not within
the statute."8 7 The court determined that no statute specifically
allowed appeals from orders of the Tax Appeals Commission, and
that such decisions could not be included under the statute which
provided for appeals from decisions which "directly affect legal
rights, duties or privileges."88
Thus, although many state courts have relied on the Abbott
Laboratories decision in support of a presumption of a right to ju-
dicial review of agency action, Nebraska is not alone in its adher-
ence to a rule which does not recognize such a presumption. The
presumption of judicial review followed by the Supreme Court is a
policy of statutory construction based upon a broad view of the au-
thority granted to the federal courts by congress.89 Consequently,
it is doubtful that the actions of state courts in not recognizing a
presumption of review, could be termed unconstitutional. Rather
83. 575 P.2d at 750.
84. See, e.g., Bush v. City of Wichita, 223 Kan. 651, 576 P.2d 1071 (1978); State v.
Washington State Personnel Bd., 82 Wash. 2d 396, 511 P.2d 52 (1973); Pasch v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 58 Wis. 2d 346, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973).
85. 58 Wis. 2d 346, 206 N.W.2d 157 (1973).
86. Id. at 350-51, 206 N.W.2d at 159.
87. Id. at 353, 206 N.W.2d at 160.
88. Id. at 355-58, 206 N.W.2d at 160-63 (construing Wis. STAT. § 227.15 (1957)). Re-
call the analysis used by the Nebraska court in Gretna where the court held
that an appeal from a declaratory ruling could not be included under the stat-
ute providing for appeals from "contested cases." See notes 24-27 & accompa-
nying text supra. The Wisconsin court in Pasch recognized the general
legislative directory of the statute authorizing appeals of agency action. The
court, felt, however, that when the legislature used the term "decision" in the
statute, it did not intend to provide for appeals of any agency decision.
Therefore, the court felt compelled to draw the line at decisions which were
'"inal," and to disallow appeals from decisions which were "interim steps" in
the administrative process. The court then held that, since the taxpayer was
appealing an order which determined that the commission had the authority
to determine the merits, and not a decision on the merits, it was not a "deci-
sion" within the meaning of the statute.
89. See notes 51-56 & accompanying text supra.
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the contrary position of such state courts reflects a more narrow
view of the general grants of authority in their respective state
statutes.
The justification for a restrictive rule logically rests on concerns
for efficiency and the avoidance of delays in the administrative sys-
tem. In Pasch, the Wisconsin court expressed concern that judi-
cial review of proceedings would unduly delay such proceedings
"for the purpose of reviewing mere procedural requirements or in-
terlocutory directions." 90  Such practical concerns are well-
founded, and certainly administrative procedures could only be
rendered less effective if citizens had the right to appeal any action
at any stage in a proceeding. A risk does exist, however, that a
restrictive rule, based upon concerns for administrative efficiency,
may be applied to deny judicial review of agency action which is
not interlocutory, but final in effect. The Gretna decision provides
an example where a restrictive viewpoint led to denial of review of
a final agency action-action which may have had serious conse-
quences for the appellant.91
A basic presumption of a right to judicial review from the ac-
tions of government agencies is the better approach to the problem
faced when a statute is silent on the issue. An opposite rule can
often lead to further confusion, as in the Gretna and Pasch cases,
where courts must then determine whether a certain agency deci-
sion is a "contested case", involves "rights and duties", etc.
The general presumption of review is also a better alternative
from the point of view of the legislature. When the legislature is
faced with a judicial rule which requires clear legislative state-
ments that actions are appealable, it must then decide whether to
make such provisions in every administrative statute, or to create
a general appeal statute for all agency actions. Such a statute, as
stated above, may result in judicial confusion over definitional
terms. On the other hand, if the legislature is aware of a judicial
rule which requires clear statutory language that actions are not
appealable, its job is much easier, and certain agency actions can
be singled out for immunity from judicial review.
The recent action of the Nebraska legislature in response to
Gretna,92 illustrates the potential difficulties caused by a no-pre-
sumption-of-review attitude by the court. After the Nebraska
90. 58 Wis. 2d 346, 354-55, 206 N.W.2d 157, 161.
91. In Gretna, the school district's funds were reduced by ten percent by the
Commissioner of Education. 201 Neb. at 770, 272 N.W.2d at 268. Neither the
opinion nor the briefs indicate how much money was involved. It is conceiva-
ble, however, that the reduction of funds could have forced the school to elim-
inate certain programs or dismiss personnel.
92. See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
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court held that a declaratory ruling was not a "contested case", the
legislature changed the declaratory ruling statute to make it clear
that such rulings could be appealed in the same manner as that
provided for contested cases. 93 Thus, both declaratory rulings and
contested cases may now be appealed to Nebraska courts. The
question remains, however, whether other agency actions may be
appealed. In light of the restrictive rule of the Gretna case, there
may be other administrative agency actions for which judicial re-
view is not provided by specific denotations, and the legislature
now has the burden of affirmatively stating which agency acts are
subject to judicial review.94 As an alternative, state legislatures
faced with a judicial rule which does not recognize a presumption
of a right to review could consider repealing such a rule by statute,
by providing that agency decisions are subject to review, except
where expressly denied by statute.95
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether by design or merely by necessity, legislatures have
delegated a great deal of authority to administrative agencies, and
the discretionary actions of appointed government officials are of
potentially great significance. Executive agencies have the author-
ity to control many aspects of the activities of corporations, small
businesses, labor organizations, educational institutions, and indi-
viduals. Although legis.latures are constantly striving to improve
their effectiveness in monitoring the actions of agencies, the size of
many agencies and the volume of activity make thorough oversight
practically impossible. Inadequate legislative oversight of admin-
istrative agencies can be partially offset by making such agencies
subject to review by courts.
Indeed, democratic principles would seem to require that the
rights and privileges of individuals and institutions be safeguarded
93. Id.
94. It seems clear that the great bulk of administrative agency action is now sub-
ject to judicial review in Nebraska. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976)
which provides for appeals of contested cases would encompass all agency
decisions in which the appellant is entitled to an agency hearing; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-911 (Reissue 1976) provides for a petition for declaratory judg-
ments to a court to challenge the validity of a rule; and L.B. 137, 86th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1979) provides for judicial review of declaratory rulings on a challenge
to the applicability of a rule. Assuming, however, that the legislature would
want to be certain that it had not unintentionally precluded judicial review of
agency actions, it would be advisable that the legislature review the statutes
governing specific state agencies. Such a review could discover any agency
actions which are peculiar to specific agencies, and which possibly would not
fit under the classes of "rule" or "contested case."
95. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (i) (1976) which provides: 'This chapter applies
... except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review. .. "
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from agency decisions which are not subject to review by some
other branch of government. A logical extension from this view-
point is a presumption of a right to judicial review of agency deci-
sions, except where expressly precluded by statute.
The Nebraska "clearly statutory" rule, as stated in Gretna, and
similar rules of other state courts, presumes that agency decisions
are not subject to judicial review unless expressly provided by
statute-a presumption which can only hinder efforts to curb the
power of government agencies. A restrictive presumption may be
supported by a policy of the courts to avoid delays and inefficiency
in the administrative system, or it may be a conscious policy to
narrow the general grants of authority under which courts operate.
However, the application of this presumption may often result in
an unfair denial of the opportunity to challenge allegedly arbitrary
or incorrect agency action. The policy of the Supreme Court-that
Congress has granted the federal courts broad authority to decide
cases and controversies, and the courts will presume judicial re-
view unless Congress clearly denies review-is preferable to the
"clearly statutory" approach. It is more practical because it causes
less pressures on the legislature to meet the court's policies of stat-
utory construction. Moreover, it is more respective of the rights of
individuals because it is a policy which presumes that individuals
have an opportunity to challenge government actions which affect
their rights and privileges. Few would condone a contrary policy
which presumes that individuals cannot challenge government ac-
tion. However the "clearly statutory" rule in Gretna reflects such a
restrictive policy, a policy which is in conflict with the basic pur-
pose of having courts of law.
James R. Wefso '80
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